

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 OSLO 06471 281401Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 DLOS-06 ACDA-07 AGRE-00 AID-05 CEA-01
CEQ-01 CG-00 CIAE-00 CIEP-01 COME-00 DODE-00 DOTE-00
EB-07 EPA-01 ERDA-05 FEAE-00 FMC-01 TRSE-00 H-01
INR-07 INT-05 IO-13 JUSE-00 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05
NSF-01 OES-06 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15
USIA-06 SAL-01 SAJ-01 NRC-05 /126 W
-----281439Z 010209 /23 45

R 281247Z DEC 76
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2982
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 6471

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR PLOS UR NO
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER OUTLINES STATUS OF NORWEGIAN-SOVIET
NORTHERN ISSUES

REFS: (A) OSLO 6438 (B) OSLO 6423

1. DURING THE COURSE OF A MEETING ON ANOTHER SUBJECT DECEMBER 27,
I ASKED FOREIGN MINISTER FRYDENLUND ABOUT THE DEADLOCK OF THE
NORWEGIAN SOVIET BOUNDARY TALKS LAST WEEK (OSLO 6438). FRYDENLUND
STATED THAT THE NORWEGIANS CONTINUED TO FIND THEIR TALKS WITH THE
SOVIETS ON THIS MATTER PERPLEXING AND FRUSTRATING. HE SAID THE
MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION WERE NEVER GIVEN ANY APPARENT
AUTHORITY TO NEGOTIATE THE BOUNDARY ISSUE. THEY SEEMED EMPOWERED
BY THEIR SUPERIORS ONLY TO RECITE KNOWN SOVIET POSITIONS. THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 OSLO 06471 281401Z

NORWEGIANS, HE ADMITTED, FOUND THIS HARD TO UNDERSTAND AND DIFFICULT
TO DEAL WITH.

2. FRYDENLUND SAID THAT AFTER LAST WEEK'S TALKS, THE NORWEGIANS
PROPOSED THAT LAW OF THE SEA MINISTER EVENSEN VISIT MOSCOW IN
JANUARY TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE "TRANSITION ARRANGEMENTS" FOR FISHING

IN THE DISPUTED BARENTS SEA AREA. THESE TALKS, HE SAID, WILL PROBABLY TAKE PLACE IN JANUARY. THE CABINET EXPECTS TO APPROVE EVENSEN'S NEGOTIATING INSTRUCTIONS ON DECEMBER 29, AFTER WHICH THE APPROPRIATE STORTING COMMITTEE WILL BE BRIEFED.

3. FRYDENLUND STATED THAT HE VIEWED THE NEW ROUND OF SOVIET MISSILE FIRINGS INTO THE DISPUTED AREA JUST AFTER THE CLOSE OF LAST WEEK'S DEADLOCKED BOUNDARY NEGOTIATIONS AS A "HEAVY-HANDED" PLAY BY MOSCOW. (THE NORWEGIAN PRESS ANNOUNCED DEC. 27 THAT THE TESTING WOULD TAKE PLACE DEC. 28-30.) HE SAID THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WOULD NOT FORMALLY PROTEST THE ROCKET FIRING TO THE USSR BUT THAT THE MINISTRY'S PRESS SPOKESMAN HAS NOTED THAT THE TESTS HINDER THE DEVELOPMENT OF NORWEGIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS.

4. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION, FRYDENLUND STATED HE DID NOT RPT NOT THINK SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO WOULD VISIT NORWAY NEXT YEAR.

5. COMMENT: I WAS STRUCK BY HOW CLOSE TO THE SURFACE FRYDENLUND'S FRUSTRATION IN DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS WAS. IT WAS ALMOST AS IF HE HAD THROWN HIS HANDS IN THE AIR IN DESPAIR OF UNDERSTANDING HIS NORTHERN NEIGHBORS. PERHAPS AS A RESULT OF THIS FRUSTRATION, THE NORWEGIANS APPEAR TO BE MOVING TOWARD A MORE RELAXED AND LOW-KEY APPROACH TO THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE USSR. THEY DO NOT WANT TO APPEAR TO MOSCOW TO BE TOO ANXIOUS OR TOO CONCERNED AND SEEM TO BE ADAPTING THEIR ACTIONS TO THIS NEW POSTURE. FOR EXAMPLE, UNTIL NOW THE NORWEGIANS HAD ALL ALONG ASSUMED GROMYKO WOULD VISIT NEXT YEAR, WITH ONLY THE DATES UNCERTAIN. NOW FRYDENLUND'S COMMENT IS A SIGN THAT THE GON HAS COOLED ITS ENTHUSIASM FOR THE VISIT. MOREOVER, IN THEIR RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS GON OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN AT PAINS TO STRESS THAT NORWAY MAY HAVE TO LIVE FOR A LONG CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 OSLO 06471 281401Z

TIME WITH NO RESOLUTION TO THE BOUNDARY ISSUE. THE DECISION TO DISPATCH EVENSEN TO SEEK TRANSITIONAL FISHING ARRANGEMENTS IN THE DISPUTED BOUNDARY AREA IS A STEP DESIGNED TO RESOLVE THE MOST IMMEDIATE PROBLEM IN THE DISPUTED AREA, ALTHOUGH THE TICKLISH QUESTIONS OF JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT WILL REMAIN, AS WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY NOTED (OSLO 6438).

6. ALSO, THE NORWEGIANS APPEAR TO BE SEEKING TO LOWER THE LEVEL OF OFFICIAL EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN ABOUT SOME OF THEIR LESSER PROBLEMS WITH THE SOVIETS. FOR EXAMPLE, LAST SUMMER, THE FOREIGN MINISTER PERSONALLY RAISED WITH THE SOVIET EMBASSY THE SOVIET REFUSAL OF VISAS TO A GROUP OF NORWEGIAN PARLIAMENTARIANS. LAST WEEK MFA UNDERSECRETARY STOLTENBERG INSTEAD EXPRESSED REGRETS TO SOVIET EMBASSY COUNSELORS ABOUT RECENT SOVIET VISA REFUSALS TO SOME NORWEGIANS INCLUDING A PARLIAMENTARIAN (OSLO 6423). IN THE PAST, THE GOVERNMENT HAS OFFICIALLY EXPRESSED CONCERN TO THE USSR OVER ITS ROCKET TESTS, ONCE AT THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S LEVEL AND TWICE THROUGH ITS EMBASSY IN MOSCOW.

THIS TIME THE GON APPARENTLY DID NOT RAISE THE ISSUE DIRECTLY WITH THE SOVIETS BUT LEFT ITS EXPRESSION OF CONCERN TO THE PUBLIC STATEMENT BY THE MINISTRY'S PRESS SPOKESMAN.

7. ANOTHER FACTOR UNDOUBTEDLY INFLUENCING THE GON TO STAND BACK A BIT NOW IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE USSR IS THE UPCOMING ELECTION. FRYDENLUND IS UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE FROM THE LABOR PARTY'S LEFT WING FOR NOT BEING A DYNAMIC AND ABLE MINISTER. HE IS CRITICIZED BY NON-SOCIALISTS FOR BEING WEAK AND VACILLATING IN HIS CONDUCT OF RELATIONS WITH THE USSR. FOR HIM PERSONALLY, THE RISKS OF A GROMYKO VISIT NOW MAY APPEAR TO OUTWEIGH THE ADVANTAGES. AND HIS LABOR PARTY COLLEAGUES ARE MINDFUL THAT THEY MUST TAKE CARE TO AVOID GIVING THE NON-SOCIALISTS A HOT ELECTION ISSUE (SUCH AS APPEARING TO BE WEAK IN THE FACE OF SOVIET BLUSTERING).

8. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN HOW THE SOVIETS WILL INTERPRET THE SIGNS THAT NORWAY IS MODERATING HER RESPONSES TO SOVIET ACTIONS, SUCH AS ROCKET TESTS AND THE BOUNDARY TALKS' DEADLOCK. THEY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 OSLO 06471 281401Z

MAY SEE THIS NEW POSTURE AS A SIGN OF NORWEGIAN WEAKNESS RATHER THAN AS AN EFFORT TO KEEP TENSIONS LOW DURING THE PRE-ELECTION PERIOD. IF SO, THEN WE WOULD SUPPOSE THERE IS LITTLE PROSPECT THAT RELATIONS WILL IMPROVE SUBSTANTIALLY DURING THE COMING YEAR. AND IF THE SOVIETS CONTINUE PLAYING HARD BALL IN THE BARENTS SEA, THEY WILL ALMOST SURELY, IN THE SHORT RUN, MAKE IT EVEN MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT TO COMPROMISE ON OUTSTANDING BILATERAL ISSUES.
ANDERS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: CONTINENTAL SHELF, NEGOTIATIONS, MEETING REPORTS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 28 DEC 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976OSLO06471
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760473-1225
From: OSLO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19761210/aaaaaica.tel
Line Count: 148
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 77 OSLO 6438, 77 OSLO 6423
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 16 APR 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <16 APR 2004 by ElyME>; APPROVED <19 APR 2004 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: FOREIGN MINISTER OUTLINES STATUS OF NORWEGIAN-SOVIET NORTHERN ISSUES
TAGS: PFOR, PLOS, UR, NO, (FRYDENLUND, KNUT)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006